INTRODUCTION
Given its paramount importance, information security in wireless networks has received a great deal of attention. In this article we focus on the security of location information in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). As vehicles are highly mobile, most VANET applications require trustworthy location information in order to function. We base our security approach on the widely used Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) information security model [1, 2] .
We present validation mechanisms to provide location integrity in VANETs. In our approach we use network cells as security as well as communication units. Providing location integrity is thus split into intracell integrity and intercell integrity. Intracell integrity consists of three mechanisms. First, we assume that all vehicles are endowed with an onboard radar device, a GPS unit, and a standard transceiver. To ensure intracell position information integrity, we propose an active validation mechanism (called active location integrity), which relies on the help of onboard radar to detect neighboring vehicles and confirm their alleged coordinates. Since radar is not currently installed in all vehicles, we propose a second mechanism (called passive location integrity), which relies on information fusion to filter out malicious data and refine low-resolution location information into high-resolution location information. Mindful of the fact that some of the vehicles in the traffic may not have any of these devices, we propose a third validation method (called general location integrity), which combines the active and passive location integrity mechanisms. Since VANET applications often need position information of vehicles that belong to different cells, we address intercell position information integrity as well. Vehicles request that their neighbors or vehicles in oncoming traffic check the alleged position information of remote vehicles. Both the request and response messages are propagated among cells.
The availability of location information is also important in VANETs. Because of the high mobility of vehicles, routing paths are often fragile and prone to disconnection. This results in situations where vehicles in different cells may not be able to communicate with each other. We propose a routing scheme that selects and maintains stable routing paths based on a better understanding of the probability distribution of car-to-car communication links under realistic traffic and radio propagation assumptions.
Given the insecure nature of wireless communication, we propose both encryption/decryption and access control mechanisms to provide location confidentiality. Often position information from multiple vehicles is aggregated to reduce the number of messages that are sent. In our approach the aggregated position message is encrypted with a key based on a geographic location that specifies the decryption region. Vehicles have to be physically present in the decryption region to decrypt and access the aggregated position information.
The relationship between the various mechanisms mentioned above is illustrated in Fig. 1 . By ensuring position information confidentiality, integrity, and availability, we achieve position information security that is compliant with the security requirements outlined in the CIA information security model.
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ABSTRACT
It is fair to say that most, if not all, VANET applications rely on accurate location information. It is therefore imperative to provide mechanisms that ensure the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of location information. In this article we present a number of location security mechanisms specifically designed for VANETs. Proposed mechanisms for location integrity range from the use of onboard radar devices and GPS to simpler methods that rely on information fusion. We also address ways to enhance the availability of location information by selecting and maintaining stable routing paths. Finally, we discuss a mechanism that promotes location confidentiality through encryption/decryption and access control using geographical information. Our location information security mechanisms meet the requirements of the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) information security model.
PROVIDING LOCATION SECURITY IN VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS
This work is supported in part by U.S.A NSF (CNS 0721586).
The authors present a number of location security mechanisms specifically designed for VANETs. Proposed mechanisms for location integrity range from the use of onboard radar devices and GPS to simpler methods that rely on information fusion.
SECURITY MODEL CIA MODEL
The CIA model [1, 2] is widely used in information security. The goal of the CIA model in information systems is to protect computers, software, and networks, and the information they store, process, and transmit. Confidentiality involves preventing disclosure of information to unauthorized individuals or systems and is often achieved by encryption. Integrity means that data cannot be modified without authorization. Availability aims to provide access to information whenever it is needed. We are investigating a subset of information security in VANETs, location information security. Guided by the requirements of the CIA model, we turn our attention to location confidentiality, location integrity, and location availability. Each of the three parts is addressed in the following sections.
THE ATTACK MODEL
Since position information is of fundamental importance in VANETs, malicious parties are apt to perpetrate the following types of attacks [3] 
LOCATION INTEGRITY
Location integrity in wireless networks is often achieved by location validation. Sastry et al. [4] proposed a validation protocol for wireless networks that can prove or disprove alleged location information. Vora et al. [5] presented a location verification method that works in wireless sensor networks. Both protocols are based on the validation of verifiers, which are assumed to be trusted entities. However, this is a very strong assumption that may not be realistic in VANETs. Ekici et al. [6] proposed a location verification method for wireless sensor networks that uses a probabilistic model. The probabilistic model is based on the claim that the distribution of k-hop distances in a linear network of node density λ and communication range R is approximately Gaussian. To the best of our knowledge, however, the relationship between the k-hop distance and the Gaussian distribution has not been confirmed in the VANET literature.
ACTIVE LOCATION INTEGRITY
We begin by presenting our first contribution, an active location integrity mechanism [7] . This is motivated by the need to provide secure topology information in VANETs and to build a secure network for applications. Underlying our solution is the well-known adage "Seeing is believing." We assume vehicles are equipped with GPS, an onboard radar device, a computer, and a wireless transceiver. In our scheme the onboard radar acts as a virtual eye of the vehicle, while the wireless transceiver acts as a virtual ear of the vehicle. Although the eyesight is rather limited due to the modest radar transmission range, a vehicle can see the surrounding vehicles and hear reports of their GPS coordinates. We expect the onboard radar device to provide useful corroboration of alleged location information, except for short transient periods. For example, the line of sight radar needs may be temporarily obstructed by a large truck. Due to the dynamic nature of traffic, even if there are transient obstructions, the line of sight will eventually be restored. In accord with other VANET researchers [8] , we assume that the majority of cars (about 85 percent) are honest players.
To overcome the inherent range limitations of radar and the wireless transceiver, we build network cells as basic security and communication units as shown in Fig. 2 . The cells are sized such that each vehicle can directly communicate with all other vehicles in its own cell. To achieve intracell security, a vehicle may use its radar to verify the alleged position of neighboring vehicles in its own cell. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that each vehicle knows, with high cer- 
PASSIVE LOCATION INTEGRITY
In this subsection we propose a method to validate position information in scenarios where an onboard radar device is not available, or its use is hampered by various traffic/weather conditions. Specifically, we propose a passive location integrity model. As already mentioned, we forgo the requirement of an onboard radar device but assume the presence of an onboard GPS and a transceiver. Vehicles collect location information from neighbors and oncoming vehicles. After validating and filtering out false or inaccurate locations using a data fusion algorithm, vehicles store the validated locations into memory to create a track record (called a Map History) of the mobility of other vehicles. Based on the Map History, position prediction can be used to validate the announced positions. The data fusion algorithm achieves intracell location integrity by counting the number of location reports and abandoning reports that greatly deviate from the majority of reports. For intercell location integrity, we apply the intracell position validation method in the cell that includes the announced position.
GENERAL LOCATION INTEGRITY
As VANET technology will be deployed incrementally, not all vehicles will have onboard radar, GPS, and a transceiver. Some vehicles will have all three, some will have only GPS and a transceiver, while others will have none of the devices. Mindful of this, we propose a validation system that works in this scenario. Vehicles will create a Map History table using radar-validated locations, opposite traffic detected positions, and neighbor location information to achieve location integrity. Each type of data is given a weight, and we apply data fusion algorithms to filter out spurious location information.
LOCATION AVAILABILITY
To provide intercell position information integrity, the aggregated position packets are propagated among cells. However, due to special features of traffic (e.g., high speeds, rapidly changing topologies), routing paths in VANETs tend to be fragile and short-lived. Key to selecting stable routing paths is a solid understanding of the probability distribution of path duration under realistic traffic and radio communication assumptions. Such a probabilistic model for car-to-car link duration was recently developed by one of the authors [9] . By incorporating this probability model into the route selection mechanism, we obtain routing paths that are reasonably stable and, at the same time, easier to construct and maintain, both locally and globally.
MULTIHOP PATH MODEL
Not surprisingly, schemes to reduce connection failure have been proposed in the literature. For example, redundant routing paths were proposed in [10] . Geographic routing that relies on accurate position of vehicles was proposed in [11] . Ho et al. [12] obtained a multihop path using the help of structured mobility (e.g., bus systems). However, these schemes are empirical and cannot determine, with any degree of accuracy, the duration of links or the probability of the existence of communication links. Furthermore, these models consider only a few parameters such as radio signal strength or distance between sender and receiver, while ignoring important mobility and radio propagation parameters. In contrast, we assume that the inter-car headway distance (i.e., the instantaneous gap between consecutive vehicles) obeys a log-normal distribution. Using this assumption and a classic radio propagation model, we derive the probability and the mean duration of a link. For details not discussed here we refer the interested reader to [9] . Our routing algorithm uses a unique vehicle ID (e.g., electronic license plate) as the network address. The source vehicle broadcasts a probing request Prb on the wireless channel. All vehicles in the transmission range receive the request and compute the distance from the sender, the duration of the link, and the probability of existence of the link. The computation is based on the formulas developed in [9] . An acknowledgment packet AckP will be constructed that contains the computed distance, duration, and probability of the link. The AckP is sent back to the sender, who will collect multiple AckPs and select the best link (i.e., the one with the highest probability and whose expected duration matches the routing path duration requirement EDur). The sender then sends a confirmation packet CfmP to the next hop on the best link. This node will further explore the routing path by broadcasting the Prb. When the destination node receives the Prb, it will terminate the probing process and send an AckP back to the source vehicle along the newly formed routing path. This completes the routing path exploration stage. 
REPAIRING A ROUTING PATH
The basic idea of maintaining a routing path is to repair those links that are expected to break soon. Expiring links can be predicted using the link duration estimation developed in [9] . These links can be locally repaired by replacing them with new links formed by neighboring vehicles or globally reconstructed using the path discovery protocol discussed above. For local repair, the destination vehicle initiates the process by sending a routing break packet RBRK at the expected expiration time of the routing path (i.e., the minimum duration of the links). Vehicles that comprise the weakest link replace it with more reliable links. A global repair is similar to finding an entirely new routing path.
LOCATION CONFIDENTIALITY
To ensure intercell location integrity, the aggregated position information of several vehicles is transmitted over the wireless medium, which is open to the public. If the aggregated message is in plaintext, it is vulnerable to an assortment of attacks. One simple solution is to encrypt the plaintext message by using conventional cryptography (e.g., using symmetric or asymmetric keys). However, key management is a very challenging task given the huge number of participating vehicles. In addition, attackers can crack conventional cryptography by employing several wellknown techniques.
To provide location confidentiality, we propose a geographic location-based security mechanism to provide physical security on top of conventional methods. Messages are encrypted with a geographic location key that specifies a decryption region. This provides physical security because a vehicle has to be physically present in the decryption region in order to decrypt ciphertext encrypted with this geographic location key. As an example, Fig. 3 shows a shaded square which is a location-based security region. The sender vehicle, a, specifies the region, creates the location key, encrypts the message, and sends ciphertext to vehicles in this region. Vehicles outside this region, such as b, c, d, and e, cannot decrypt the message. Only vehicle f can decrypt the message because it is physically inside the decryption region. Since the decryption region can be dynamically specified, attacks are extremely expensive and difficult to mount.
AN OVERVIEW OF ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION
We now discuss geographic location-based security in a client-server scenario where the server is fixed, and its public information such as GPS location and public key are known to all client vehicles. The assumptions for location-based authentication are the following:
• A trusted authority that releases the map, GPS coordinates, keys, and so on • Tamper-proof hardware to protect GPS information • Homogeneous system: the proposed hardware and software pre-installed in vehicles We extend Scott and Denning's GeoEncryption algorithm [13] by removing the public key and private key requirement on client vehicles. If vehicles use PKI to communicate, they have to exchange the public key before they can communicate. Constantly broadcasting public keys is not efficient for communication, especially in realtime applications. In our scheme client vehicles do not need public/private keys of vehicles. Only the fixed servers have to maintain public and private key pairs. A symmetric encryption algorithm is used on clients (vehicles) because a symmetric algorithm encrypts/decrypts faster than an asymmetric one.
We use Scott and Denning's [13] idea of a GeoLock to map the geographic location of the decryption region of the server into a lock value. This ensures that a vehicle must be physically present inside the decryption region to decrypt the message. In Scott and Denning's GeoLock algorithm, the mapping is based on a fixed table that has to be synchronized on all nodes. In our technique, the inputs to the tamper-proof GeoLock function are a GPS position and the length of the square decryption region. The GPS coordinates are divided by the length of the decryption region. The concatenation of the integral remainders of the GPS coordinates are then hashed to produce the GeoLock. To create regions of varying size, we allow the length to be specified as 1, 10, 100, or 1000 m. An example is shown in Fig. 4 .
Our technique involves a security key handshake stage and a message exchange stage, as shown in Fig. 5 . In the key handshake stage, the client and server negotiate a shared symmetric To ensure inter-cell location integrity, the aggregated position information of several vehicles is transmitted over the wireless medium which is open to the public. If the aggregated message is in plaintext, it is vulnerable to an assortment of attacks.
key. The client generates two random numbers as keys Key_S and Key_C. Key_S is used to encrypt a message composed of the aggregated location message and Key_C. This encrypted message is E{Req}. The client generates a GeoLock based on the location of the server. This value is XOR-ed with Key_S and then encrypted using the server's public key Key_E to produce the ciphertext E{Key}. Both E{Req} and E{Key} are transmitted to the server through the wireless channel. When the server receives E{Key}, it is decrypted using the server's private key Key_D to produce the XOR of the GeoLock and Key_S. The GeoLock generated from the GPS location of the server is used to recover the secret key Key_S. Then Key_S is used to decrypt E{Req} to obtain the aggregated location message and the secret key Key_C.
In the message exchange stage, the server and client use the shared Key_C to communicate. When the server wants to reply to a client, it generates a random number, Key_S′. The reply message is directly encrypted using Key_S′ to generate a ciphertext, E{Rep}. Since the aggregated location message contains the client's GPS position, the server can generate a GeoLock of the client vehicle's decryption region. This GeoLock is XOR-ed with Key_S′ and then encrypted with Key_C to generate a ciphertext, E{Key′}. Both E{Rep} and E{Key′} are transmitted to the client through the wireless channel. E{Key′} is then decrypted using Key_C to recover the XOR of the client's GeoLock region and Key_S′. The client generates its GeoLock based on its current location. This is used to recover the secret key Key_S′. E{Rep} is decrypted using Key_S′, and the reply message is recovered. The client repeats the algorithm in the message exchange stage to communicate with the server.
For more details on GeoLock and our geolocation encryption/decryption technique, readers are referred to [14] .
LOCATION-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
Access control is usually granted by a unique entity that plays the role of an authenticator. Access (read, write, delete, modify, etc.) is granted only if the validation is successful. In VANETs position information can be used to enhance access control. Users are allowed to access data only in a specified region, and users outside the specified region cannot access the data. As an example, Fig. 6 shows a locationbased access control region, the shaded square. Sender vehicle a sends a message to vehicles in this region. Vehicles outside this region (e.g., b) cannot read this message. Only vehicle c can read this message. The method to implement location-based access control is based on GPS coordinates. In Fig. 6 vehicle a specified a region described by two GPS coordinates, P 0 (x 0 , y 0 ) and P 1 (x 1 , y 1 ). When a vehicle located at P 2 (x 2 , y 2 ) receives an access controlled message, it checks If the position of vehicle P 2 passes the check, it is granted access rights; otherwise, access is denied.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
The proposed methods can prevent most position attacks in VANETs. We now show how each type of attack is addressed by our scheme: • Fabrication attacks: The location integrity model has three schemes to filter out fabricated location information: active, passive, and general location integrity schemes in the simple to realistic scenarios (vehicles with radar, vehicles without radar, and mixture of the two types of vehicles).
• Alteration attacks: The location confidentiality model can prevent location information from being modified by unauthorized vehicles. • Packet dropping: The location availability model can detect malicious packet dropping and establish a reliable routing path that avoids intentional packet dropping.
• Replaying: The location integrity model can validate the correctness of location information at the specified time and vehicle ID.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article we have presented a number of location security mechanisms specifically designed for vehicular networks. The proposed mechanisms range from the use of onboard radar and GPS devices to simpler methods that rely on information fusion. We have also discussed ways to enhance the availability of location information by selecting and maintaining stable routing paths. Location confidentiality is also preserved by encryption/decryption and access control mechanisms based on geographical information. The three security aspects of location information meet the requirements of the CIA model. Privacy is a major concern in VANETs. Since privacy is often linked with location information, the proposed location security mechanisms can be extended to protect privacy in VANETs. This is an exciting area for future work.
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